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Florida's Minority Participation in Legal
Education Program
LYRA LOGAN, ESQ.
I am Lyra Logan, and I run Florida's Minority Participation in
Legal Education Scholarship Program which I administer from Miami.
So, welcome to sunny Miami-Dade County, Florida, a racial and ethnic
melting pot the likes of which you will rarely have the pleasure of visit-
ing. Here each day over two million people from approximately 140
countries speak all major and various other languages. But that's
Miami-Dade County, Florida, ladies and gentlemen. Get in your rental
car and head north on 1-95. Look around, and you will quickly realize
that you have left 56% of the State's Latino population behind. Keep
driving, and it won't be long before it becomes crystal clear that you're
in a State that still is very much a part of the Deep South, where Blacks
and whites still mostly keep to their own separate and unequal sides of
the railroad tracks; a State in which no racial minority has ever won a
statewide election; a State whose official song refers to Blacks as
"darkeys" and where thousands protest angrily at attempts to change that
song; a State where, in 1991, despite a population consisting of roughly
26% minorities, the State Bar had a membership consisting of only 6%
minorities and where, in 1998, those numbers still have not risen all that
much.
How did this State, the Florida I just described, become the only
State in the union to establish a Minority Participation in Legal Educa-
tion Program, that is, a statewide state-funded affirmative action scholar-
ship program designed to increase the numbers of Blacks, Latinos and
other minorities practicing law? The answer: Black and Latino mem-
bers of the Florida Legislature retreated from a bitter battle over control
of a new minority law school and coalesced to meet their common goal
of increasing the number of minority attorneys in the State.
I will use my time this afternoon first to detail the historical back-
ground that led to forming this coalition and establishing the unique
Minority Participation in Legal Education Program (the "MPLE Pro-
gram"). That description will make clear the point of divergence
between the two groups as well as the theory and realities that bind
them. Then I'll talk about the changing political landscape in Florida
which in its various mutations has supported the coalition. That discus-
sion will lead me to talk about the dangers the coalition and Program
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face in the future and the lessons progressives should draw from this
entire experience.
Now, I will provide some necessary historical background. Many
would say that this story began over thirty years ago when the State
closed the law school at historically Black Florida A&M University
(FAMU). In June 1964, Florida's State University System examined
legal education in Florida and determined that three actions would help
the University System meet an anticipated increase in demand for law-
yers. Those three actions were: (1) to expand the size of the all white
University of Florida Law School; (2) to close the all Black FAMU Law
School, purportedly for failure to graduate a significant number of stu-
dents who would later be admitted to the Bar; and (3) to create instead a
law school at predominantly white Florida State University (FSU).
In keeping with that plan, in 1965, the all-white Florida Legislature
transferred the FAMU Law School funds to FSU to begin the law school
there.' Needless to say, many Blacks and others called the move racist,
unjustified, and unfair. Notwithstanding those expressed sentiments,
FSU's law school began operating in 1966, and FAMU's law enrollment
was phased out by 1968.
The next relevant action took place when the State University Sys-
tem reviewed statewide public legal education again in 1985 and 1990.
In both reviews, the State University System found that Florida had a
sufficient number of lawyers to meet its needs but that minority partici-
pation in legal education and in the legal profession was seriously lim-
ited: the Board estimated that 4% of lawyers were minorities; 3%
Latino and 1% Black. Due to other more pressing public university con-
cerns, however, the Board listed minority under-participation in legal
education as a lower overall priority for the 1990's and beyond, but did
commit to seek options for addressing the shortage.
The next relevant event occurred when Florida's Supreme Court
formed a Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission. In 1990, that
Commission published the first part of its study entitled Where the
Injured Fly for Justice,2 a report and recommendations focusing on the
broad issue of reforming practices which impede the administration of
justice. The study listed the critical shortage of minority law students,
attorneys and judges as a major impediment to the fair dispensation of
justice to minorities in Florida.
In response to these various findings of low minority participation
in law, the Florida Legislature, in 1991, required the State University
1. S. 346, 1965 Legis. Sess., Chapters 65-309, in Laws of Florida, 1065.
2. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, PART I, Report
and Recommendations (December 11, 1990).
[Vol. 53:743
FLORIDA'S MINORITY PARTICIPATION
System to study the feasibility of reestablishing the FAMU law school.3
The State University System presented the results of the study in a
December 1991 report.4 The report determined that the new law school
would cost more than $25 million to start and $8 million to run each
year. The report further found that, once begun, the new school would
not graduate candidates who could sit for the Florida Bar Exam for sev-
eral years. The report, therefore, also suggested more immediate options
to respond to the under-representation of minorities. One of those
options was creation of the MPLE Program.
Little else happened until the State Legislature's 1993 session, dur-
ing which Florida International University (FLU), regarded by some as
the State's "Hispanic" university, began its own campaign for control of
the proposed new minority law school. The resulting competition
between FIU and FAMU spurred a racially tinged fight between Black
and Latino legislators.
FAMU, which is 90% Black, argued that in fairness it should get its
law school back and pointed to its successes at educating Black profes-
sionals. The State's Black legislators, who are approximately 1/4 of the
Legislature's Democrats, supported FAMU and leaned heavily on white
Democrats to do the same.
FIU, which is 50% Latino and 11% Black, argued that because of
the large minority population in Miami-Dade County, the law school
should be located on its Miami campus and pointed to its record of grad-
uating the most minority students in the State University System. All
Latino legislators but one, all of whom were from Miami and made up
approximately 13% of the Legislature's Republican party, supported
FIU and had the backing of most other Republicans. Thus the partisan
and racially divisive battle raged but was left unresolved.
A major event occurred in September 1993, when the State Univer-
sity System adopted its 1993-1998 Five Year Master Plan, a great por-
tion of which dealt with legal education. In the Plan, the University
System rejected the new law school proposal, noting that the State
already had six accredited law schools, with applications down at five of
them, and also had one of the highest lawyer-to-population ratios in the
nation. It decided though, that, while Florida's taxpayers should not be
asked to pay to produce more lawyers via a new school, the State needed
more minority lawyers and judges. To meet that need, the University
System officially proposed the MPLE Program, which would be
3. S. 1314, 1991 Legis. Sess., Chapters 91-272, in Laws of Florida 2567.
4. Board of Regents, Florida State University System, Feasibility Study for a Third Public
Law School under the Auspices of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, December 13,
1991.
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designed eventually to fund enrollment for 200 minority law school stu-
dents and 134 undergraduate pre-law students each year.
Finally, during the State Legislature's 1994 session, even while
FlU and FAMU continued to bicker over a school few actually thought
the State needed or could afford, a Black legislator in the House and a
Latino Senator sponsored a bipartisan, biracial compromise bill to create
the MPLE Program and begin immediately to address the shortage of
minorities in law.5 The bill passed the Senate and the House and the
Governor signed it into law.
What I have just described for you is an experience that began as
divisive competition but eventually resolved itself through a dual com-
munity coalition that positively affected the making of social policy.
The legal education coalition between Florida's Latino and Black com-
munities successfully launched and survives for at least three main
reasons.
One reason the Black/Latino coalition succeeds is that the two
groups found common ground. They temporarily put aside individual
desires and began to work toward a shared and widely supported ulti-
mate goal that lends itself to joint attainment. That goal is to use the
State to help increase the numbers of minorities in the legal profession.
Another reason the Black/Latino coalition succeeds is that, for at
least 1993-98, the State could not justify giving either group the law
school it initially sought. The State University System rejected a new
law school as unnecessary and too costly, recommending instead that the
State direct its scarce resources to more pressing undergraduate educa-
tional concerns.
I should note that, despite the University System's rejection, at any
time the Legislature could have forced the issue, approved a school and
sent the matter to the Governor for review. But, since Governors rarely
approve education expenditures the University System has not
requested, Governor Lawton Chiles likely would have vetoed plans for a
new law school, particularly in view of the cost.
If the State had decided to give a school to one group, the coalition
obviously would not have been necessary; one group simply would have
triumphed, perhaps to the detriment of the other. The State's refusal to
give either community a school forced the groups to work together or
each walk away with nothing as they had done in 1993.
Another reason the Black/Latino coalition succeeds in maintaining
the Program is that the coalition and the Program have existed in a sup-
5. H.R. 1309, 1994 Legis. Sess. (Comm. Substitute), Chapters 94-145 in Laws of Florida
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portive, though dynamic, political climate. The Program was created in
1994 by affirmative vote of a Democratic controlled House and an even
split Senate, with the support of.a Democratic Governor who has recom-
mended the Program in his proposed budget every year since.
Each year since creation, the Program has had to endure the Legis-
lature's budget review process in order to receive continued funding.
The interesting part of the story is that the reviewing Legislature has
changed twice since initial approval, after the elections every other year.
During the 1995 and 1996 Legislative sessions, Democrats retained
control of the House, but Republicans took the lead in the Senate. In
1997 and 1998, Republicans controlled both the Senate and the House.
Naturally, questions arose about the Program's fate after Republi-
cans took control, since, as we know, the Republican Party generally
disfavors affirmative action. The Program has survived, though, in the
midst of this change of control largely because of the support of Flor-
ida's most powerful Latino group, Cuban Americans, most of whom,
again, are Republican. They currently are 13% of the Republicans in the
State Senate and 14% of the Republicans in the House. To maintain
Cuban support, Republicans in Florida often must tolerate ideas, solu-
tions, coalitions they quickly condemn and combat in other states. For
that reason, the Program still could thrive even if, in November 1998,
the State elects a Republican Governor to serve with the Republican
controlled Legislature, as long as Cuban legislators continue to support
the Program.
That brings us to possible future threats to the Black/Latino coali-
tion for legal education. There are at least three.
One springs from the two groups' main point of divergence: each
still wants its own law school. Both FAMU and FIU have told the State
University System that a law school is among its top priorities for the
five year period from 1998-2003. If the State decides in the future to
add a new school, the coalition will fail if the groups again divide and
fight fiercely for control. If that battle reheats and intensifies, chances
for future alliances on any issue will become more and more remote.
Also, if one group gets a school, the other group may well find its under-
representation left inadequately addressed.
Another future threat to the Black/Latino coalition is the Florida
Civil Rights Initiative, Florida's version of Prop. 209. Proponents have
sought to amend the State Constitution to end preferential treatment in
public education, employment, and contracting, through both the citi-
zen's initiative and the Constitution Revision Commission processes. A
newspaper recently opined that the Republican party asked the propo-
nents to table the issue so that it will not be a part of the 1998 gubernato-
1999]
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rial campaign. Many feel they will revive the crusade shortly after the
governor's race concludes. If they succeed in winning a constitutional
preferential treatment ban, the MPLE Program as presently operated will
likely end.
Another future threat to the Program is a possible federal constitu-
tional challenge. Many in higher education say Florida is ripe for legal
challenge because of its demographics and its numerous race-based pro-
grams. As we all know, the Podberesky6 and Hopwood' cases make
race-based programs hard to defend. The holdings in those cases
already have caused the Florida Bar Foundation to modify a program
which provided law school scholarships to Black students. After Hop-
wood, the Foundation reviewed its program and decided no longer to
limit the program to Blacks. If the MPLE Program is challenged, a
court may find that it violates constitutional law.
To conclude, I simply will note that the story of the Minority Par-
ticipation in Legal Education Program in Florida has been a model les-
son in coalition building and maintenance. It shows how two minority
groups can stop fighting over limited resources, can acknowledge a
common goal and then can pool their power to attain it. It also demon-
strates the strategic importance of minorities maintaining considerable
presence in both major political parties so that changes in control will
less likely jeopardize a minority coalition's work.
Today, Florida is a State, and indeed America is a nation, made up
mostly of various minority groups. We in those groups must find ways
to put differences aside, to pool our strength and to work together more
to guarantee that all institutions, including our legal system and our
courts, reflect the society in which we live.
6. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 US 1128 (1995).
7. Hopwood v. State of Texas, et al., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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